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One of my first wishes, as the newly appointed director of the 
Center of Civil Law Studies (in August 2005), was to invite 
Professor Saúl Litvinoff to give the Thirty-third Tucker Lecture.  
However, Don Saúl had his own agenda and his wish was to have 
me deliver the lecture!  I could not start in my new function by 
contradicting my highly respected and distinguished predecessor.  
He offered me the splendid opportunity of giving an inaugural 
lecture here at LSU.  I dedicated this lecture to him, as a tribute to 
his outstanding achievements, as a vibrant homage to his 
contribution to the development of the civil law inside and outside 
of the state of Louisiana.  In addition to being a highly learned man 
of science, a walking encyclopedia of the civil law in so many 
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languages, a prominent comparatist, Don Saúl is what we call in 
French un Grand Seigneur and, as some still know, nobility is 
before all a quality of the heart.   
In 1938, on the occasion of the Dedication of our “old” Law 
Building, standing at the top of the outdoor steps between the six 
high columns, Roscoe Pound presented his thoughts on the 
influence of the civil law in America.1  It was published seventy 
years ago as the first article in the first issue of the Louisiana Law 
Review; I gave my Tucker Lecture in 2006, on the centennial of 
the Paul H. Hebert Law Center; this was the 33rd Tucker Lecture, a 
third of a century, the year where I celebrated my 50th birthday, a 
half of a century.  All these are nice signals inviting us to look 
again where we stand, collectively and individually.  Roscoe 
Pound has influenced legal thought not only in America but also in 
France, through his friendship and long-lasting intellectual 
relationship with Edouard Lambert, the founder in Lyon of one the 
very first Institutes of Comparative Law ever created on the planet 
Earth.  I feel bound to say this because a friend and colleague of 
mine in Lyon, Hervé Croze, recently published a book on Law on 
the Planet Mars.2  Pound and Lambert exchanged ideas on 
standards, on the principle of proportionality, and on a number of 
other things that have made their way into the jurisprudence of 
both jurisdictions.3  
In 1938, Pound described a civil law tradition threatened by too 
much nationalism, especially in Europe.  He said that the 
development of comparative law could give the civil law a future 
in America, even outside Louisiana where it was then experiencing 
a renaissance.4  Today, many civil law jurisdictions feel under 
threat, but this time the enemy is globalization, which seems to 
promote the American common law as a model all over the world, 
at least in the field of commercial law. The World Bank complains 
about too much rigidity and some inadequacies in nations that 
                                                                                                             
1. Roscoe Pound, The Influence of the Civil Law in America, 1 LA. L. REV. 
1 (1938). 
2. PHILIBERT LEDOUX, INTRODUCTION AU DROIT MARTIEN: LE PREMIER 
ROMAN JURIDIQUE (2006). 
3. Olivier Moréteau, Le standard et la diversité, in LAW AND HUMAN 
DIVERSITY, 71, 80 (Mauro Bussani & Michele Graziadei eds., 2005).  
4. Roscoe Pound, Comparative Law in Time and Space, 4 AM. J. COMP. L. 
70, 77 (1955). 
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happen to have a civil law system.5  Also, everything around us is 
changing so fast that some may wonder, especially outside civil 
law jurisdictions, whether codification may still offer a satisfactory 
framework in the 21st century.  Let me say first that the problems 
the World Bank is complaining about have little to do with Codes 
as such, but relate mostly to bureaucracy and corruption and aim 
mostly at some former French colonies in Africa and the 
Caribbean.  
Louisiana is a civil law island in a common law ocean; France 
sees its once revered Napoleonic tradition threatened by new 
models, the German one being strongly promoted by many 
working on the project of a European Civil Code.  Both in France 
and in Louisiana, there is this growing feeling amongst civilians 
that the French model of codification may not resist.6  I do believe 
that the reaction cannot be local. In France it is all too often 
provincial.  Coming back from the splendid conferences 
commemorating the bicentennial of the Code Napoleon,7 Rodolfo 
Sacco noted: “the French may accept a European Civil Code but 
on three conditions,  
- Firstly, it must be written by the French; 
- Secondly, it must be written in French; 
- And thirdly, it must be the French Civil Code itself.” 
The reaction must be open, and comparative, as Pound 
indicated.  It is a strong sign that my two French predecessors 
giving the Tucker Lecture were great comparatists:  René David in 
19738 and André Tunc in 1978.9  This Law School always 
understood the importance of comparative law, with a decisive 
                                                                                                             
5. WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS IN 2004, UNDERSTANDING REGULATION 
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7. Impressive collections of papers have been published: LE CODE CIVIL 
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impetus under the leadership of Chancellor John Costonis, whom I 
would like to acknowledge as a man of vision.  It is therefore no 
surprise that I should present a comparative outlook on the 
situation of the Civil Codes after two hundred years of codification 
in these two jurisdictions.  
It is fair to keep loyal to a tradition, to cherish one’s roots and 
be proud of one’s past and ancestors.  In this period of doubt we 
are going through, we are meant to focus on what makes us strong 
in the global competition.  To do that, let us revisit the function of 
codes in the civil law tradition, adopting a comparative approach. 
We may then be able to see more clearly some mistakes we 
should avoid if we want to keep our tradition alive, and also if we 
want it to grow in the future.  Because Louisiana is a multicultural 
and bijural state, it is our responsibility to give the civil law a 
chance to diffuse and permeate other traditions in a global world, 
which is more and more a mixed or hybrid, as Don Saúl would put 
it.  
Let me get at these two points in turn:  revisiting the function 
of codes in the civil law tradition and imagining the place of codes 
in a multicultural world. 
 
I. REVISITING THE FUNCTION OF CODES  
IN THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 
 
In 1994, during a short visit to the University of North Carolina 
at Chapel Hill, I gave a talk on codes, which was published under 
the title of “Codes as Strait-Jackets, Safeguards and Alibis: The 
Experience of the French Civil Code.”10  My point was to dispel 
some misconceptions about codes in the common law world, 
showing a common law audience that codes are not strait-jackets 
but are meant to safeguard people’s rights.  I also pointed out that 
in France, the generality of many code articles not only helps to 
keep the law flexible but also serves as an alibi to activist judges, 
who decide cases on the basis of new doctrines, often invented by 
scholars, then finding some vague provision to support the ruling.  
Let us revisit these ideas, looking at them alternatively with 
civilian and common law eyeglasses, to show that codes are not 
strait-jackets but safeguards, at least in the French and Louisiana 
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Experience of the French Civil Code, 20 N.C.J. INT’L & COM. REG. 273 (1995). 
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tradition, and then to decide whether it is right or wrong to use 
them as alibis.  
 
A.  Codes are not Strait-Jackets but Safeguards 
 
As I said in my UNC address, “Lawyers in common law 
countries tend to consider the codified civil law systems as 
restrictive and mechanical.”11  I cited Roscoe Pound, who said: 
As a critic has put it, the theory of the codes in Continental 
Europe in the last century made of the court a sort of judicial 
slot machine.  The necessary machinery had been provided in 
advance by legislation or by received legal principles and one 
had but to put it in the facts above and take out the decision 
below.  True, this critic says, the facts do not always fit the 
machinery, and hence we may have to thump and joggle the 
machinery a bit in order to get anything out.  But even in 
extreme cases of this departure from the purely automatic, 
the decision is attributed, not at all to the thumping and 
joggling process, but solely to the machine.12 
What happens here is that common-law lawyers13 project their 
conception of the detailed and specific statute on their vision of 
Civil Codes.  But the reality is different:  most codes in civil law 
countries contain open-textured provisions, general rules and 
principles, and they are seldom too detailed even in specific 
provisions.  Saying this, I have in mind Civil Codes rather than 
Tax Codes or Town Planning Codes, the latter proving that 
civilians, when they lose their distinct qualities, can be as bad as 
common-law lawyers in producing lengthy detailed provisions.  
To cite a couple of examples from the Civil Code: 
Contracts have the effect of law for the parties and may be 
dissolved only through the consent of the parties or on 
grounds provided by law.  Contracts must be performed in 
good faith.14 
                                                                                                             
11. Moréteau, supra note 10, at 273. 
12. ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW, 170-171 (1921). 
13. In my oral presentation, I used the traditional term common-lawyer, but 
I have been led to understand that it is perceived as derogatory in the United 
States. 
14. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1983 (2007); C. CIV. art. 1134 (FR.). 
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Any act whatever of man that causes damage to another 
obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.15  
We should pay attention to the way we civilians communicate 
concerning the use of our Codes, which may cause more prejudice 
rather than reduce it.  When we claim: “our Codes are so well 
made, they can apply to situations of all kinds,” we refer to the 
generality of the Code that allows application to situations the 
drafters could not even have imagined at the age of the stagecoach, 
such as flying airplanes or sending e-mails.  But the common-law 
lawyer is likely to understand:  “This Code must be packed with so 
many rules!  How may Napoleon have thought of everything that 
could happen on earth?”  And who knows, our common-law 
lawyer might even think further:  “If not reformed constantly, their 
Code must be outdated in so many respects, not a law for the 21st 
century, but a strait-jacket for retarded or crazy civilians!” 
To show that this is not the case, I come now to the political 
and philosophical reason why the French Civil Code was written 
the way it still is, even after decades of reforms.  The style is 
simple; sentences are short and easily readable. Some of them are 
nearly as easy to memorize as old Roman law maxims.  The 
vocabulary is largely non-technical.  
This style is an indication of the drafters’ intention to protect 
the citizen against the wrongful interference of the judiciary, which 
had been abusive during the centuries preceding the Revolution.  
As I once wrote, the Code is “almost free of the legal jargon often 
used by professionals to establish their authority and protect their 
power.  Like the text of a constitution, it is meant to be understood 
by ordinary citizens, without the interference of verbose lawyers, 
who sometimes strive to make the law more complicated than it 
really is.”16 
The French Civil Code has been represented to be the “civil 
constitution” of the country.  It is meant to safeguard people’s 
rights.  France may have had some thirteen constitutions; it is still 
living under its original Civil Code (of course substantively 
amended), as much as the Americans live under their original 
Constitution.  The Civil Code largely performs the functions of a 
constitution, at least if defined in the American sense, and it easily 
                                                                                                             
15. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (2007), C. CIV. art. 1382 (FR.). 
16. Moréteau, supra note 10, at 279. 
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compares to the United States Constitution by its generality and its 
style.  
Book I of the French Civil Code, entitled “Of Persons,” 
presently starts with a Title 1, “Of Civil Rights,” where we find the 
following articles: 
Everyone has the right to respect for his private life.17 
Everyone has the right to respect of the presumption of 
innocence.18  
Article 16, introduced in 1994, deals with human dignity.  The 
articles that follow deal with the protection of the human body. 
Of course there is much else in a Code, like rules on the forms 
of testaments, on prescription and on transfer of obligations.  The 
point is that with Code articles so clear, making frequent use of 
plain language, it should not be possible for judges to distort the 
meaning and make unpredictable judgments.  The rights of the 
citizens therefore are safeguarded from the risk of judicial abuse.  
This leads us to the great paradox of French law.  Judges can 
play a much more creative role when applying the Civil Code than 
when construing detailed legislation.  In fact, in the opinion of 
Portalis, the most prominent of the Code’s draftsmen, judges were 
clearly intended to play such a role.  Portalis is well known in 
Louisiana.  Shael Herman has translated his Preliminary Discourse 
to the Civil Code19 and Alain Levasseur wrote a splendid article 
entitled “Code Napoleon or Code Portalis?”20 
Portalis was a political moderate and also an impressive 
philosopher.  In his Preliminary speech, he explained the two 
extremes that legislators should avoid: oversimplification, “leaving 
citizens without rule or guarantee concerning their greatest 
interests,” and going too far into details.21 
Extremely detailed rules, it was thought, could not resist 
evolution and would have to be amended too often, which creates 
insecurity.  Portalis tells the judge how to deal with legislation: 
                                                                                                             
17. C. CIV. art. 9 (FR.). (Law n° 70-643 of  July 17, 1970). 
18. C. CIV. art. 9-1 (FR.) (Law n° 93-2 of January 4, 1993). 
19. Shael Herman, Excerpts from a Discourse on the Code Napoleon by 
Portalis, 18 LOY. L. REV. 23 (1972). 
20. Alain Levasseur, Code Napoleon or Code Portalis?, 43 TUL. L. REV. 
762 (1969). 
21. Levasseur, supra note 20, at 769. 
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When the legislation is clear, it must be followed; when it 
is obscure, we must carefully analyze its provisions.  If 
there is no particular enactment, custom or equity must be 
consulted.  Equity is the return to natural law, when 
positive laws are silent, contradictory, or obscure.22 
This was never written into the French Code but made its way 
almost verbatim into the Louisiana Civil Code, in original article 
21,23 replaced by article 4 in the 1987 revision, with a regrettable 
abandonment of the reference to natural law, under the pretence 
that “the term ‘natural law’ in article 21 of the 1870 Code has no 
defined meaning in Louisiana jurisprudence.”24  With due respect, 
the term is meaningful in all civil law jurisdictions, as it is also in 
the common law world.  But it is rejected as contentious by 
positivists in both systems. 
Portalis then made this magnificent statement:  
There is a science for lawmakers, as there is for judges; and 
the former does not resemble the latter.  The legislator's 
science consists in finding in each subject the principles 
most favorable to the common good; the judge's science is 
to put these principles into effect, to diversify them, and to 
extend them, by means of wise and reasoned application, to 
private causes; to examine closely the spirit of the law 
when the letter kills.25 
And he concludes on the value of experience:  “It is for 
experience gradually to fill up the gaps we leave.”26  This echoes 
with O.W. Holmes:  “The life of the law has not been logic, it has 
been experience.”27  The value of experience should be 
acknowledged in all legal systems. 
Portalis invites the judge to contribute to the evolution of the 
law through judicial interpretation.  The judge is meant to 
complement and update the work of the legislator.  But the text is 
there, general and clear.  It cannot be so easily distorted and is 
therefore a good safeguard. 
                                                                                                             
22. Id. at 771. 
23. Located at the same place in the Civil Codes of 1808, 1825, and 1870. 
24. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 4 cmt. (b) (2007). 
25. Levasseur, supra note 20, at 772. 
26. Id. at 773. 
27. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). 
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Then, looking at the Civil Code with Portalis’ eyes, how could 
one get the idea that Code articles may serve as alibis? 
 
B.  May Civil Code Provisions Serve as Alibis? 
 
This is probably the point where the French experience and the 
Louisiana experience differ most, due to a different vision of what 
the Civil Code is.  The French Civil Code marked the unification 
of French law, for which the kings of France had been striving, 
without much success.  The draftsmen reached this remarkable 
compromise between the rich Roman law heritage, chiefly applied 
in the South of France, and the profuse and diverse customary laws 
(yet with a predominant and highly sophisticated custom of Paris) 
applied mostly in the North.  They also managed to reconcile some 
Ancien Régime values with Revolutionary ideas, thereby 
strengthening this fundamental constitutional nature of the Code.  
The Ancient law was abolished, which indicates a break with the 
past, but the break is not complete, the Code borrowing much 
substance from preexisting laws, especially the royal ordinances, 
and the books of Domat and Pothier.28  
In Louisiana, the Civil Code was not meant to change the 
preexisting law.  It was called a Digest of the Civil Laws in force in 
the Territory of Orleans.  It was meant to restate Spanish Law in 
force at the time of the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, borrowing the 
style and the structure of the French Civil Code and also its 
substance when it expressed Spanish law as well as the French.  
Here too a remarkable compromise was achieved between the 
French and Spanish legal traditions, in producing what Robert 
Pascal, in his 1998 Tucker lecture, pleasantly and accurately 
described as a “Spanish girl in French dress.”29  
Consequently, when French judges referred to the Ancient law 
in order to apply a new provision, it was safe for them to hide that 
part of the reasoning and to refer exclusively to the intention of the 
legislator, claiming they were doing the exegesis of the Code.  On 
the other side of the Atlantic, their Louisiana colleagues would 
openly refer to the ancient Spanish law not only in order to explain 
the rule as it appeared in the Code, but upon the understanding that 
                                                                                                             
28. See for a comprehensive historical approach, JEAN-LOUIS HALPÉRIN, 
THE CIVIL CODE (David W. Gruning trans., 2000). 
29.  Robert A. Pascal, Of the Civil Code and Us, 59 LA. L. REV. 301, 303 
(1998). 
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this was the proper manner to complement the Code provision 
when too general or incomplete, the now two hundred year old 
Civil Code of 1808 being meant to be a Digest of preexisting 
laws.30  Article 3521 of the Civil Code of 1825 repealed the 
preexisting law on all matters covered by that Code.  Article 3521 
resembles the repeal clause adopted in the Act promulgating the 
French Civil Code.31  The absence of such a repealing clause in the 
Digest of 1808 made the experience of codification a different 
story in France and in Louisiana.  Further studies may be needed to 
check to what extent this difference has been increased by the fact 
that, more often than not, the Louisiana Civil Code was applied by 
judges trained in the common law.32  
In 19th century France, judges hid behind the letter of the Code 
when referring to Ancient law.  In 19th century Louisiana, the letter 
of the Code was sometimes seen as printed on transparent windows 
opening to the past, pretty much like the English codifying statutes 
of the Victorian age, the presence of common law trained judges 
being of course instrumental.  
Again, through a civilian perspective, this appears as sheer 
loyalty to the Code in both France and Louisiana.  Having 
identified the law to the general will of the people, and legislation 
as the privileged expression of that general will, the French claim 
that the exegesis of the Code leaves no room to judicial creativity 
but is based on the research of the intention of the legislators.  
Working on a similar premise, the Louisianans feel justified to rely 
on pre-code authorities, the Code being meant to be a restatement 
of such authorities.  
Now, how do things appear if looked at from an outsider’s 
perspective?  It is easy to trace what the Louisiana judge is doing, 
since judgments are drafted almost the same way as in common 
law jurisdictions.  In France, however, the Cour de cassation 
writes extremely brief and not informed judgments, where one 
                                                                                                             
30. Cottin v. Cottin, 5 Mart. (O.S.) 93 (1817); see RICHARD KILBOURNE, A 
HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE: THE FORMATIVE YEARS 1803-1839 
(1987). 
31. French Law of March 21, 1804 re-promulgating the Civil Code as a 
whole. 
32. The Bicentennial of the Louisiana Digest of 1808 is generating such 
studies, the Center of Civil Law Studies at LSU having commissioned a world 
expert on codification to work out the problem.  See JACQUES VANDERLINDEN, 
LE CONCEPT DE CODE EN EUROPE OCCIDENTALE DU XIIIE AU XIXE SIÈCLE, ESSAI 
DE DÉFINITION (1967).  
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hardly gets information about the facts and never reads a single 
reference to previous cases or to doctrinal sources.  Code articles 
are interpreted in paragraphs of three lines, creating the impression 
that the solution flows directly from the article.  It takes legal 
expertise to understand a Court of Cassation judgment, and one has 
to rely on comments written by scholars or distinguished 
practitioners to understand where the jurisprudence goes.  
The Cour de cassation acts covertly, using the visa of the 
article like a Mardi Gras mask.   It often goes far beyond the text or 
the spirit of the Code, sometimes for the good, sometimes wrongly.  
It may be argued that when, in the law of contract, it introduced the 
doctrinal distinction between obligations to provide a certain result 
(obligations de résultat) and obligations to provide certain means 
(obligations de moyens), finding some support in the articles of the 
Code, it acted within the spirit of the Code.33  But when it 
implements a shift from liability based on fault, as provided for in 
article 1382 (corresponding to article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil 
Code), to liability based on a supposed necessity to guarantee 
victim’s rights, creating multiple cases of strict liability wherever 
the damage is caused by a thing the defendant had under his 
custody, it then denies the spirit of the Code and interferes with the 
exercise of legislative power.34  
Interpretation based on exegesis already gives judges an 
immense latitude, yet legitimated by the spirit of the Code.  
Inviting them to go further, in the guise of “free scientific 
research” as recommended by Gény and Saleilles some hundred 
years ago, may sometimes lead to a denial of the principle of 
separation of powers, although supposedly revered by the French.  
Saleilles’s celebrated formula, “au delà du Code civil, mais par le 
Code civil,” inviting to go “beyond the Civil Code but through the 
Civil Code,” is an elegant pirouette, providing a smart alibi.35  It is 
a very fertile strategy, enabling judges to go well beyond the text 
and also sometimes beyond the spirit of the Code.  It is to be 
remembered that until 1993, it was a criminal offence in France for 
                                                                                                             
33. Moréteau, supra note 10, at 284-287. 
34. Id. at 287-288. 
35. Raymond Saleilles, Preface to Francois Geny, SCIENCE ET TECHNIQUE 
EN DROIT PRIVÉ POSITIF (1913).  I owe to Paul Baier the origin of this famous 
phrase, modeled on Jhering’s words: durch das römische Recht über das 
römische Recht hinaus.  Rudolf von Jhering, Unsere Ausgabe, 1 JAHRBÜCHER 
FÜR DIE DOGMATIK DES HEUTIGEN RÖMISCHEN UND DEUTSCHEN PRIVATRECHTS 
52 (1857). 
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a judge to decide a case on the basis of general rules or principles 
devised by the courts.36  Until then, many Court of Cassation 
judges would have been in prison if not allowed to wear elegant 
Mardi Gras masks.  
My point is not to blame Gény and Saleilles, two giants who 
have made a huge contribution to the development of the civil law, 
promoting the jurisprudence whilst keeping the codes alive.  As 
Paul Baier puts it, “Life after text frees the judge.”37  Rather, I 
would blame the French for this to be done in some hypocritical 
way, more than two hundred years after the Revolution.  We allow 
the Cour de cassation to dress up its ruling as if flowing naturally 
from the text of the Code, even when it is not so.  The French 
jurisprudence is a world of fiction.  On the one hand, the literature 
and the teaching in the law schools deny that jurisprudence may be 
a direct source of the law, and on the other hand, everyone seems 
to accept the existence of an activist, uncontrolled jurisprudence.  
To me, it is a social wrong to allow the jurisprudence to be 
formulated covertly, without the court disclosing its reasoning, its 
sources.  The late André Tunc, who gave the 7th Tucker Lecture at 
LSU,38 once urged for fully argued and reasoned judgments, 
especially at the Court of Cassation.39  However, nobody 
demonstrated in the streets of Paris to fight for more transparency 
in judicial opinions:  things stayed more or less where they were.  
Yet, under the enlightened presidency of Guy Canivet, the Court of 
Cassation made substantial progress in disclosing the arguments 
supporting its rulings.40 
                                                                                                             
36. Article 5 of the Civil Code states that “judges are forbidden, when 
giving judgement in the cases which are brought before them, to lay down 
general rules of conduct....” C. CIV. art. 5 (FR.).  A judge who violated this 
prohibition was guilty of a criminal offense. Code pénal [C. PEN.] art. 127 (FR.) 
(repealed by the new Penal Code which came into force on April 1st, 1994).  
Article 5 was intended to prevent judges from returning to the old practice of 
making arrêts de règlement, i.e., stating in a judgment a general rule to be 
applied in forthcoming cases. 
37. La vie après le texte libère le juge: Paul Baier, The Supreme Court, 
Justinian, and Antonin Scalia: Twenty Years in Retrospect, 67 LA. L. REV. 489, 
514 (2007); footnote 81 offers a stimulating translation exercise. 
38. Tunc, supra note 9. 
39. Touffait & Tunc, Pour une motivation plus explicite des décisions de 
justice, notamment de celles de la Cour de cassation, [1974] REV. TRIM. DR. 
CIV. 487.   
40. Guy Canivet was Premier Président between 1999 and 2007. He has 
promoted the use of foreign sources and transparency.  See Guy Canivet, La 
pratique du droit comparé par les cours suprêmes, Brèves réflexions sur le 
dialogue des juges dans les expériences françaises et européennes : en 
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Using Civil Code articles as alibi to judicial activism is not as 
easy in Louisiana.  The Louisiana judge is bound to give and 
develop arguments in the judgment and one may believe that any 
betrayal of the letter or the spirit of the Code would not go 
unnoticed. Yet, this does not prevent Louisiana judges from 
injecting rules or principles that are not based on the Civil Code. 
To conclude this section, I regard transparency in public affairs 
as a virtue and I disapprove of alibis, even when dressed up with 
French elegance.  Here are some recommendations to keep our 
Civil Codes healthy for a better future.  I will venture four, of 
unequal importance. 
1. We must clarify our speech when we talk about the 
sources of the law.  When addressing the matter from the 
top end of the pyramid of norms, it may be right to say that 
legislation and custom are the direct sources of the civil 
law.  Both are based on the will of the people, as expressed 
by their representatives in the case of legislation, and as 
produced and evidenced by the people in their daily life in 
the case of custom.  But when considering the matter from 
the people’s viewpoint, turning the pyramid top down,41 it 
may be wrong to say that legislation and custom are the 
only sources.  We must acknowledge that the law is shaped 
by a number of other actors or factors. In good days, our 
belief in higher values often referred to as “natural law,” 
“equity,” and “general principles of the law” shapes 
positive rules established by legislation, influences judges 
when deciding cases in the absence of applicable law and 
also trumps positive laws when courts sanction an abuse of 
right or apply the maxim fraus omnia corrumpit, fraud 
corrupts everything.  The teaching and publications of law 
professors, referred to as “doctrine” in the civil law 
tradition, shape the way laws are made, applied, 
interpreted.  The decisions of judges, referred to as 
“jurisprudence,” have a direct impact on the people, 
                                                                                                             
 
commentaire de l’article de Sir Basil Markesinis et Jörg Fedtke Le juge en tant 
que comparatiste, 80 TUL. L. REV. 221 (2005).  
41. This metaphor is used by Jacques Vanderlinden, Réseaux, pyramide et 
pluralisme ou regards sur la rencontre de deux aspirants-paradigmes de la 
science juridique, 49 REVUE INTERDISCIPLINAIRE D’ÉTUDES JURIDIQUES 11 
(2003). 
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whether judges apply the Code, distort it or create rules ex 
nihilo.  The acts and deeds of practitioners referred to as 
“practice” also have a tremendous impact on the people, for 
the good and occasionally for the bad.  All these shape the 
rules we apply, in such a way that Rodolfo Sacco came to 
call them “legal formants.”42  Acknowledging the existence 
and the role of all actors and factors helps us to have a 
better understanding of what is going on in the civil law, as 
in all other legal systems.  The development of the law is 
indeed based on the interaction of such actors and factors.  
Making that clear would no doubt help us to have a better 
grasp of what the law is.  This helps to identify the driving 
forces, which are at times customary, legislative, 
jurisprudential or doctrinal and very often a combination of 
all, including legal practice.   This way we would enrich, 
rather than revise the doctrine of sources, being mindful  of 
a duality of perspectives, distinguishing the law as it ought 
to be (the upstream lawmaker’s perspective or formalistic 
doctrine of sources) and the law as it is applied and 
perceived by those subjected to the rule (the downstream 
citizen’s perspective or pluralistic doctrine of sources).  
This way of looking at things may also help transcend a 
narrow positivist approach, the moral dimension of norms 
and judgments being inescapable in both perspectives. 
2. Those civil law countries–I mean France and the 
countries following the French model–not imposing on 
their higher courts the duty to give reasoned opinions 
together with their judgments should be pressed to do so. 
3. We should insist on what makes the strength and the 
value of Civil Codes:  being written in clear and precise 
style, free of legal jargon, wherever it appears suitable to 
state the law in advance, ex ante (e.g., testaments, 
matrimonial regimes, securities), and as clearly but less 
precisely, in the form of general rules or principles, where 
the law may not be very detailed in anticipation of a great 
variety of events, such as in the case of civil liability or 
                                                                                                             
42. Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: a Dynamic Approach to Comparative 
Law, 39 AM J. COMP. L. 1 (1991). 
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torts, where most rules happen to be developed by the 
courts ex post, once particular events happen.  It may be 
enough there for the Code to give a framework in order to 
safeguard people from sometimes obscure doctrines that 
never got a chance of being discussed publicly. 
4. We should also be able to identify these driving forces 
and principles in common law jurisdictions.  I could cite 
quite a few cases, mostly English, where wise and learned 
judges reject a proposed distinction, insisting that the 
principle underlying the precedent does not allow such a 
distinction to be accepted.  Such principles innerve 
codifying statutes such as those adopted in England in the 
late 19th century.  They innerve the Uniform Commercial 
Code and also the United States Constitution.  I am not sure 
this is a civil law influence.  This may simply be in the very 
nature of what a legal system is. 
We would then be better equipped to promote the French and 
Louisiana model in a multicultural environment.  
 
II. IMAGINING THE FUTURE OF CODES  
IN A MULTICULTURAL WORLD 
 
Talking about the place of Civil Codes in a multicultural world, 
I would like to stress the following point.  My insisting on the civil 
law and common law traditions does not mean that I tend to ignore 
other legal traditions.  They do exist and have a huge impact 
outside western societies and should not be ignored inside western 
societies.43  
I will make four points here, some very brief. 
1. Codification, under different forms, is a predominant 
technique to harmonize the laws in mixed jurisdictions.  
2. A true Code may bring homogeneity only if linguistic 
problems are properly taken into account. 
3. Comparative law should help identify principles common to 
diverse human societies and identify the underlying values. 
                                                                                                             
43. See my comments in Olivier Moréteau, Post Scriptum to Law Making in 
a Global World: From Human Rights to a Law of Mankind, 67 LA. L. REV. 
1223, 1223 (2007). 
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4. Then, the civilian method of interpretation may be promoted, 
even outside civil law jurisdictions. 
 
A. Codification, Consolidation, and Harmonization 
 
The European Union is spending significant amounts of money 
on research projects that may lead to a unification of the civil law 
(in the sense of private law, excluding commercial law).  Had I 
believed in the suitability and feasibility of a European Civil Code, 
who knows, I might have stayed in Europe to try to dispute with 
others the glory of being called the European Portalis! 
However, I am a European federalist and a legal pluralist, 
believing that we should allow Member States to keep their own 
private laws, in all fields not regulated by the Union, as is the case 
in the United States.  
Ongoing projects give an idea of what could be the features of 
a European Civil Code.  Professor Christian von Bar of the 
University of Osnabrück is piloting a flotilla of working groups in 
different areas of private law.44  This may work only if groups and 
sub-groups communicate well and if someone keeps an overall 
view.  
The Commission on European Contract Law, chaired by 
Professor Ole Lando, of the Copenhagen Business School, already 
produced the Principles of European Contract Law.45  More 
recently, the European Group on Tort Law published the Principles 
of European Tort Law.46  These are great achievements, based on 
careful comparative studies, but they lack the comprehensiveness 
of an overall view of the law of obligations, a major input of the 
civil law tradition.47  Only a comprehensive and comparative 
                                                                                                             
44. Visit the website of the Study Group on a European Civil Code: 
http://www.sgecc.net/  (last visited October 17, 2009). 
45. THE PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW PARTS I AND II (Ole 
Lando & Hugh Beale eds., 1999); PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, 
PART III (Ole Lando, Eric Clive, André Prüm & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 
2003). See  http://frontpage.cbs.dk/law/commission_on_european_contract_law/ 
(last visited October 17, 2009). 
46. EUROPEAN GROUP ON TORT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW, 
TEXT AND COMMENTARY (2005); see also http://www.egtl.org/ (last visited 
October 17, 2009). 
47. Olivier Moréteau, Revisiting the Grey Zone between Contract and Tort: 
The Role of Estoppel and Reliance, in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2004, 60, par. 4-6 
(Helmut Koziol & Barbara Steininger eds., 2005).  
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approach may help to clarify issues.  It is essential to have an 
overall view when making a Code.  
Now, these sets of Principles are not Codes in the traditional 
sense, meaning that they lack this comprehensive character of Civil 
Codes.  Also, they are purely doctrinal. In a recent article, I called 
them “doctrinal codes.”48  They have been compared to the 
American Restatements of the Law.  Like in the Restatements, 
articles are followed by a comment.  By the way, I am somehow 
astonished to see the almost binding force recognized to the 
comments under the revised articles of the Louisiana Civil Code.  
This reminds me of the comments Boissonade, a French scholar of 
the 19th century, wrote under the articles of his project of a Civil 
Code for the Empire of Japan, a text that remains very influential 
despite the adoption of the German model.49  A commentary is 
certainly suitable in a doctrinal code, but is it right to have it in a 
Civil Code?  I do not think so. 
However, these sets of Principles do share some features of the 
traditional codes:  the so-called principles take the form of rules 
that are phrased in a rather general and brief style, avoiding heavily 
technical terms; they are organized in a rather systematic way, with 
some cross-references and some basic principles.  One may 
question the legitimacy of such codes.  They are the work of 
scholars and never received the approval of a legislature.  Actually, 
they are model laws that may inspire the European and national 
legislators, or judges where they do not find clear guidance in their 
domestic law.  
They are much more than compilation, and it is to be wished 
that if the European Union pushes the idea of a European Civil 
Code, they will look in the direction of such projects rather than 
produce a huge compilation of European Rules and Regulations, 
which would only be a code in name. 
The French are fearful of such projects.  Part of it is nostalgia, 
but France is less and less loyal to the model of its ancestors.  The 
new codes are mere consolidations (codification à droit constant) 
and some of them, like the Consumer Code, are pumping substance 
out of the Civil Code.  France also fears too strong a German 
influence.  In my view, the German Civil Code cannot be the 
                                                                                                             
48. Olivier Moréteau, Boissonade revisité: de la codification doctrinale à 
une langue juridique commune, in DE TOUS HORIZONS, MÉLANGES XAVIER 
BLANC-JOUVAN, 103, 116-117 (2005). 
49. Id. at 109-113. 
56                JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES               [Vol. 2 
 
model of a European Civil Code.  The BGB is too much a product 
of abstract legal science; it addresses the lawyers and not the 
citizens.  Only lawyers can find their way around this code.  It may 
contain very scientific and refined concepts, it may be much more 
precise and systematic than the French Civil Code, yet it lacks this 
quality France and Louisiana once considered paramount: it is not 
an accessible and easily readable code.  
My point here is that we should keep promoting the ideal of 
Codes accessible to citizens, even if we know that citizens often 
need lawyers to explain and defend their rights.  We do not want to 
make their situation any worse.  A plurality of good models, of 
national codes and doctrinal codes, will no doubt help towards the 
improvement of national codes and European legislation, and it 
may be helpful elsewhere in the world. 
 
B. Linguistic Challenges 
 
I will not be long on linguistic challenges, although it is a 
central field in my scholarship.50  They may be daunting when one 
has to deal with a transystemic approach (civil law and common 
law) in too many languages:  the EU now has to cope with more 
than twenty official languages.  In my opinion, it is wise to have a 
limited number of working languages and we should develop a 
standard or transystemic terminology that would then translate 
easily in different languages.  
I will just say that Louisiana offers the rest of the world a rich 
contribution as to expressing the civil law into English.  The 
translations from French into English of the Codes of 1808 and 
1825 may contain a number of mistakes, using “door” where the 
                                                                                                             
50. Olivier Moréteau, Can English become the Common Legal Language in 
Europe?, in COMMON PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 405 (Reiner 
Schulze & Gianmaria Ajani eds., 2003).  See also, in French, L'anglais pourrait-
il devenir la langue juridique commune en Europe?, in LES MULTIPLES LANGUES 
DU DROIT EUROPÉEN UNIFORME 143 (Rodolfo Sacco & Luca Castellani eds., 
1999); Le prototype, clé de l’interprétation uniforme: la standardisation des 
notions floues en droit du commerce international, in L’INTERPRÉTATION DES 
TEXTES JURIDIQUES RÉDIGÉS EN PLUS D’UNE LANGUE (Rodolfo Sacco ed., 2002); 
La common law en français et l’Europe, 5 REVUE DE LA COMMON LAW EN 
FRANÇAIS 135 (2003); Premiers pas dans la comparaison des droits, in 
JURILINGUISTIQUE: ENTRE LANGUES ET DROITS; JURILINGUISTICS: BETWEEN LAW 
AND LANGUAGE 407 (Jean-Claude Gémar & Nicholas Kasirer eds., 2005); O. 
Moréteau & D. Lamèthe, L’interprétation des textes juridiques rédigés dans 
plus d’une langue, REV. INT. DR. COMP. 327 (2006). 
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French says “croisée,” a term meaning window,51 and yet the 
Louisiana civilians have been very inventive in developing a 
breadth of new English terms.  I started promoting the Louisiana 
legal terminology in the area of comparative obligations,52 and will 
keep working on this, since it is so useful in the context of the 
European Union and globalization. 
 
C. Identifying Principles and Values 
 
In civil law countries operating on the French model, principles 
are clearly articulated and easy to find in the codes and literature, 
and the lawyer’s job is often to look for exceptions.  It is not so in 
the Germanic model where rules are more explicit and precise, and 
less accommodating for exceptions.  However, there are some 
fundamental principles in German law as well, like for instance the 
fundamental concept of wrongfulness in tort law, whereby 
compensation may be due only where something wrong was done 
to the plaintiff.  I avoided a doctrinal war with the Germans when 
accepting the reference to wrongfulness in the Principles of 
European Tort Law:53  I believe this principle should also underlie 
French law, even if not expressed in the Code and abandoned by 
the Cour de cassation. 
In the common law, principles do not appear upfront. Legal 
reasoning is built on the facts of the case.  This does not mean that 
principles do not play a role.  They are to appear faintly in the 
background.  If thrown forward in the judgment, they will be 
described as obiter dictum on account of their generality, but they 
are there:  the comparatist sees them.  
The principle in the Code is part of what we civilians call the 
rule. In the common law judgment, it is not so, if you look at 
things from a formalistic point of view.  The principle is not a 
technical part of the rule, it is not part of the ratio decidendi or 
holding, but functionally it commands the rule to be applied.  For 
instance, we may say that there is, in the law of negligence, a 
                                                                                                             
51. See Louisiana Civil Code art. 2716, before the 2004 Revision, and Shelp 
v. National Surety Corp. 333, F.2d 431 (5 Cir. 1964), discussed in 
L’interprétation des textes juridiques rédigés dans plus d’une langue, supra note 
50, at 341-342. 
52. Project to Reform the Law of Obligations (Catala Project): One 
Project, Two Translations, France, in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2006, 196, 196-197 
(Helmut Koziol & Barbara Steininger eds., 2007). 
53. Art. 1:101, supra note 46. 
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general rule that the defendant must compensate the victim of the 
tort if found in breach of a duty of care.   And there is a principle 
that such a duty exists wherever the defendant was in a position 
reasonably to foresee that an act or omission of his may harm the 
plaintiff.  Technically, this is not binding, but we have to accept 
that it is there in all cases where the defendant is found liable. 
Some lawyers do not like to be reminded of these principles, 
may be because they are too indicative of the values that underlie 
the rules.  The famous dictum by Lord Atkin in Donoghue v. 
Stevenson, where the learned judge referred to the moral principle 
that one must love one’s neighbor, becoming in law a rule that one 
must not injure one’s neighbor is found embarrassing by some.54  
Lawyers, especially in America, claim that laws are legitimate 
when matching the needs of a liberal economy.  French lawyers 
refer constantly to some social values which often end up in the 
questionable protection of particular groups.   Lawmakers are 
today acting under the pressure of lobbyists and the general idea of 
a public good is too often left aside, because it may contradict 
some strategies and private interests. 
The great Civil Codes of France and Louisiana cannot be 
reduced to a body of positivist norms.  They are inspired by a 
vision of law as social order promoting the public good, in the best 
interest of individuals who would otherwise fight and litigate 
endlessly.  Legal judgment is value based:  the respect of human 
dignity on the one hand, and the future of mankind as a whole on 
the other hand, are for me the two landmarks we should never 
forget in any judgment on human affairs.  They are our best guides 
to decide the trickiest cases, especially those linked to environment 
or bioethics.55 
I cannot defend the French and Louisiana Civil Codes if 
reduced to a positivist norm.  But I do believe they offer mankind a 
suitable model if we read them and apply them with Portalis’ eyes, 
or if we project into them the sense of human values that great 
judges of the 19th and early 20th centuries developed into Anglo-
American jurisprudence. 
Then, the methods of interpretation that civilians have inherited 
from their Roman law ancestors can make sense, to interpret 
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55. Moréteau, supra note 43. 
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whatever code, constitution or charter that will be written in clear 
and simple terms. 
 
D.  The Civilian Method of Interpretation 
 
Regrettably, we do not spend much time talking to our students 
about the common good and shared principles.  My experience is 
that all over the world, students want to master the rules and learn 
them like recipes.  Easy and effortless learning is as popular as 
fast-food.  
We do not spend enough time exploring the civilian method of 
reading and interpreting the codes.  At least in my Law of 
Obligations class I try to do so, prolonging what I taught in Legal 
Traditions.  My students are sometimes bemused when I ask them, 
in a case, how the judge applied or interpreted an article of the 
Code.  Their spirit rather jumps from one case to the other, like 
their appetite from the burger to the freedom fries.56 
Judges in France and Louisiana, like those in any other civil 
law jurisdiction, apply some traditional rules of interpretation that 
sometimes sound mysterious to common-law lawyers.  Specialia 
generalibus derogans: where two rules seem to control the same 
facts, the specific rule controls and the general rule is to be left 
aside.  
Yet, if this specific rule creates an exception to the general 
rule, it is to be construed restrictively, and no extension by analogy 
is permitted.  
Another rule is more difficult: ubi lex non distinguit, non 
distinguere debemus.  The judge is not supposed to introduce in a 
text a distinction that is not there.  For instance, if Code provisions 
state that the victim of a tort is entitled to compensation for the 
whole damage, and constantly refers to damage without breaking 
down the concept into various categories of damage, a court may 
not exclude mental suffering or pure economic loss if no such 
exclusion appears in the Code.  The common-law lawyer is at a 
loss there, because of mental structures based on the by-gone 
system of the writs, opening remedies only in particular types of 
cases.  The writs are gone, but the mental structure remains, like 
when you remove the cake from the form, as I described with 
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Jacques Vanderlinden in our work on the structure of legal 
systems.57  The endless discussions on compensation of pure 
economic loss would give a good illustration, but may take us too 
far.  
Wherever we find a Code, a Charter, a Bill of Rights, a 
Constitution written in general terms, the civil law tradition brings 
adequate tools to interpret or to work out definitions.  I remember a 
workshop with my Boston University colleagues where we 
discussed the interpretation of the Commerce Clause in the United 
States Constitution and their amazement when I told them:  let’s 
first try to define the term and find out what falls into it by nature.  
If agriculture or industry do not fall into the definition of 
commerce, does the phrasing of the Constitution, and its spirit, 
allow for analogies?  How may we work out these analogies?  
Well, we are back to Roscoe Pound and his plea for a comparative 
approach, to show the relevance of the civil law in America.  
To conclude, we may go much further showing that system 
building is not creating strait-jackets but safeguarding rights, if we 
legislate in simple terms and agree to look at the reason behind the 
words (the ratio legis) and ultimately, the principles or values 
behind the legal systems (ratio iuris).  A body without a soul is a 
corpse.  A Code or Constitution without a spirit is just a maze of 
dead words.  We may be trained in the civil law or in the common 
law, but what is the point of what we do if we do not bring life into 
it?   
                                                                                                             
57. Rapport Général, in LA STRUCTURE DES SYSTÈMES JURIDIQUES 13, 45-
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